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Lay Abstract 
 
This study investigated the ability of individuals with a mild form of autism, called high-
functioning autism (HFA), to recognise pictures of every-day objects. The pictures were 
degraded in order to make the objects harder to recognise. Previous studies suggested that 
the recognition of degraded objects is impaired in individuals with severe forms of autism. A 
further finding is that individuals with autism have problems related to social interactions 
with others, but are fine when ‘interacting’ with non-living objects, such as computers and 
tools. Therefore the current study also looked at whether the recognition of impoverished 
objects was influenced by the objects’ animate or inanimate nature.  
 In the first picture presented, 1000 small elements (each having the shape of a grain of 
rice) were shown, all with random orientations. In the next 19 consecutively presented 
pictures, about 200 of these element gradually formed the contour line of an object, such 
that in the final picture the object was clearly visible. This sequence gave the subjective 
experience of an object gradually appearing out of a fog.  
 We found that the HFA group required more pictures to recognise the degraded objects 
than a control group. Crucially, this difference depended on the nature of the objects as it 
was only found for animate objects; with respect to inanimate objects the groups did not 
differ. The results suggest a specific impairment in individuals with HFA in recognising 
animate objects. The results are discussed in relation to social functions of the brain.  
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Scientific Abstract 
 
The ability to identify animate and inanimate objects from impoverished images was 
investigated in adults with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFA) and in matched 
typically-developed (TD) adults, using a newly developed task. Consecutive frames were 
presented containing Gabor elements that slightly changed orientation from one frame to 
the next. For a subset of elements, the changes were such that these elements gradually 
formed the outline of an object. Elements enclosed within the object’s outline gradually 
adopted one and the same orientation, outside elements adopted random orientations. The 
subjective experience was that of an object appearing out of a fog.  
 The HFA group required significantly more frames to identify the impoverished objects 
than the TD group. Crucially, this difference depended on the nature of the objects: the HFA 
group required significantly more frames to identify animate objects, but with respect to the 
identification of inanimate objects the groups did not differ. The groups also didn’t differ 
with respect to the number and type of incorrect guesses they made. The results suggest a 
specific impairment in individuals with HFA in identifying animate objects. A number of 
possible explanations are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder (ASD); concept forming; Gabor; impoverished objects; 
animate; inanimate. 
 
 
Introduction 
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One of the earliest cognitive deficits found in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
concerns the forming of new concepts or object categories [Johnson & Rakison, 2006]. In 
particular the distinction between animate and inanimate object categories has been shown 
to pose challenges for individuals with ASD [Rutherford, Pennington, & Rodgers, 2006]. 
Various anecdotal cases have been described where the behaviour of children with autism 
suggested they had somehow not discriminated between the animate and inanimate nature 
of the objects that surround them. For example, Kanner and Lesser [1958] noted the autistic 
child ‘‘is aware of people … but considers them not differently from the way he (or she) 
considers the desk, bookshelf, or filing cabinet’’. A failure to develop a clear differentiation 
between animate and inanimate concepts will have far-reaching consequences as it impacts 
on the child’s understanding that different kinds of objects possess different physical, 
psychological, biological and motion related properties [Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001].  
 
Investigations into the diverse, multi-faceted, nature of the deficiencies in ASD that 
encompasses cognitive, emotional and motor domains, have been characterised by a 
tendency to focus on either low- or high-level aspects. An influential high-level approach 
argues that individuals with ASD fail to represent, and therefore understand, other’s 
thoughts and intentions, that is, they lack a Theory of Mind [Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995], the ability to read the behaviour of others (and of themselves) in 
terms of epistemic mental states (e.g. desires and beliefs). It has been proposed that it is 
especially the spontaneous/automatic reading of other’s behaviour on the basis of social 
cues that is impaired in ASD [Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Jellema et al., 2009; 
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Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009].  Low-level approaches include those claiming that individuals 
with ASD have a specific cognitive profile characterised by a focus on local rather than  
global processing, often referred to as weak central coherence [Happé & Frith, 2006; Happé 
& Ronald, 2008], or characterised by enhanced low-level visual processing [Mottron et al., 
2013]. However, the findings are often conflicting and paint a mixed picture of strengths 
and weaknesses, and of perceptual and attention preferences [e.g. Koldewyn, Jiang, 
Weigelt, & Kanwisher, 2013]. Some reports suggest that when matching for intellectual 
disability, weak central coherence in ASD disappears [Bernardino et al., 2012]. Furthermore, 
studies examining coherent form detection, which requires global processing, tend to find 
this capacity to be generally intact in ASD [Koldewyn, Whitney, & Rivera, 2010; Milne et al., 
2006] or to be linked to ASD severity, with even superior coherent form detection in mild 
ASD and impairments in more severe forms [Tsermentseli, O'Brien, & Spencer, 2008]. 
Another low-level approach focuses on deficits in executive functions [Russell, 1998], 
such as response inhibition and cognitive flexibility [Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001; Geurts, 
Corbett, & Solomon, 2009; Van Eylen et al., 2009; Burnett & Jellema, 2013].  
One challenge autism research is facing is to understand how relatively low-level deficits, 
such as impairments in cognitive flexibility or a preference for local processing, may give rise 
to a cascade of impairments culminating in high-level deficits in social reciprocity and 
Theory of Mind. For example, the ability to switch between concepts rapidly and accurately 
may affect success in especially social interactions, as in social interactions the mental states 
and intentions of those interacting may change rapidly and unexpectedly. Further, an 
inability to pull together multiple strands of information, as is required for global processing 
[Happé & Frith, 2006], or a lack of perceptual integration skills causing a disturbance in the 
interplay between mid and high-level vision [Verbeke et al., 2005; Evers et al., 2014], could 
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all result in a failure to extract higher-level meaning from social cues, culminating in 
impaired social understanding.  
 
One other relatively basic ability that could have far-reaching repercussions for social 
functioning and for the establishment of a Theory of Mind is the ability to discriminate 
between, and hence attach appropriate characteristics to, animate and inanimate objects. 
Several strands of evidence suggest that individuals with ASD may be more apt, and/or 
more interested, in visually processing inanimate than animate objects. For example, 
individuals with ASD were less likely to identify animate motion [Blake, Turner, Smoski, 
Pozdol, & Stone, 2003; Congiu, Schlottmann, & Ray, 2010]. Individuals with ASD were also 
better at discriminating between pictures of buildings than pictures of people [Boucher & 
Lewis, 1992], and were impaired in recognising  degraded faces but not degraded household 
objects after being primed with the un-degraded versions [Loth, Gomez, & Happé, 2010]. 
However, there are also reports of intact perception of animacy in HFA [e.g. McAleer, Kay, 
Pollick, & Rutherford, 2011], but these studies tend to focus on the recognition of intentions 
derived from animacy rather than recognition of specific animate objects, which may recruit 
different abilities.  
 
Not much is known about the possible mechanisms underpinning these aberrant results. 
Does it reflect a poor discrimination between objects categories in general, or is it more 
specifically linked to the animate or inanimate categories? Studies of electrophysiological 
markers for social percepts (faces) suggest a specific dysfunction in systems for processing 
animate stimuli in individuals with ASD, rather than a non-specific information processing 
problem (McPartland et al., 2011). 
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The current study 
The study aimed to explore possible impairments in the forming of new object concepts 
from impoverished images in individuals with HFA, and to determine whether the animate 
or inanimate nature of the objects impacts on the identification rates. Not only the correct 
responses, but also all the incorrect guesses made prior to giving the correct answer, were 
analysed. A crucial aspect of the current study is that the objects were presented such that 
local details were absent as much as possible. The objects could only be identified on the 
basis of their interrupted outline, which did not contain any sharp angles or characteristic 
details. These outlines were formed by Gabor elements against a background of other 
Gabor elements. Gabors are sinusoidal gratings, typically with a Gaussian envelope, which 
are frequently used as stimuli in psychophysical and neurophysiological experiments [Hess 
& Field, 1999]. Over successively presented frames, the outlines gradually adopted the 
correct shape, while the elements enclosed by the outline gradually adopted one and the 
same orientation, giving the impression of an object gradually emerging from a dense fog. 
Presumably, participants would try and group disjoint elements into an outline and surface 
on the basis of the elements’ proximity and similarity in orientation. This grouping process 
would then presumably be facilitated (or possibly hampered) by top-down input from 
candidate object representations. Several iterations of this cycle of feed forward and 
feedback processing might be necessary, in which different object representations are 
tested against the available evidence [Panis & Wagemans, 2009; Sassi, Vancleef, Machilsen, 
Panis, & Wagemans, 2010]. 
Due to the presumed local over global preference, the availability of merely global 
information is expected to make the task more challenging for the HFA group, which might 
help ‘bring out’ possible impairments in the animate-inanimate domain. In contrast, in the 
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Burnett and Jellema [2013] study, the to-be-identified objects did contain local information 
as the outlines were uninterrupted. Hence, the HFA group in the Burnett and Jellema [2013] 
study could still have benefited from their superior local processing mode in identifying 
objects.  
There is little knowledge of how adults with HFA perform on concept forming 
(identification) tasks, with most studies focussing on severely impaired individuals. The 
current study uses a sample of adults (university students) with HFA (or Asperger’s 
syndrome) who have IQ scores within the normal range, no developmental delay in 
language or cognitive abilities, and no substantial motor deficits. They do, however, display 
reciprocal social and communication deficits, but all to a lesser degree than in autism [Frith, 
2003]. As both the clinical and control group consisted of university students with fairly 
similar daily routines, a good approximation of the influence of the factor ‘HFA’ on concept 
forming could be obtained.  
  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
  
Clinical Group 
 
Twenty students (15 males; mean age = 22.1 years, SD = 6.6), with a diagnosis of HFA or 
Asperger’s syndrome from prior psychological reports based on DSM-IV criteria [American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000], were recruited through disability services from universities in 
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the North-East of England (UK). Evidence of diagnostic history for ASD was acquired and the 
ADOS (Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, module 4) was completed with a trained 
examiner (HGB). The ADOS is a semi-structured, standardized assessment of 
communication, social interaction, and imagination, designed for use with children and 
adults suspected of having ASD [Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 1999]. A score of 7-9 
indicates autism spectrum and a score of 10 or more indicates autism. All participants met 
the ADOS criteria for HFA or Asperger syndrome [mean total ADOS score = 7.9; Table 1]. 
There was no evidence of language delay and all participants had a cognitive ability within 
the average range or above. Their mean IQ score was 117.1 [assessed using the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997], their mean AQ (Autism Quotient 
questionnaire) score was 30.7 [range = 18 - 44; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin 
& Clubley, 2001]. The AQ is a fifty-statement, self-administered, questionnaire designed to 
measure the degree to which an adult with normal intelligence has traits associated with 
ASD. The idea is that each individual occupies a position on a population-wide continuum, 
determined by the extent to which they possess autistic(-like) traits. Although the AQ is not 
a diagnostic tool, a score of 32 or higher (out of 50) has been shown to be indicative of ASD 
[Baron-Cohen et al., 2001]. 
 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
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Typically developed (TD) group 
Twenty students (12 males, mean age = 21.2 years, SD = 3.7) were recruited at the 
University of Hull. All TD participants completed an online version of the AQ prior to the 
experiment (mean AQ = 12.2; range = 5 – 22). Their mean IQ score was 116.5 [WAIS IV, 
Wechsler, 1997], which did not differ from that of the HFA group (P = 0.73).  
All TD and HFA participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and provided 
written consent prior to the experiment. Participants received course credits or a fee for 
taking part. The study was approved by the University Ethics committee.  
  
Stimuli 
 
Fifty-six objects were selected from a large set of outline drawings of a wide range of 
animate and inanimate objects [Wagemans et al., 2008], which in turn were based on line 
drawings by Snodgrass and Vanderwart [1980]. Normative identification rates had been 
established for all outlined objects [Wagemans et al., 2008]; the animate (28) and inanimate 
(28) objects selected for the current study did not differ in their mean identification rates 
(t(54) = .30, P = .765). 
 
The animate category consisted exclusively of animal species and all inanimate objects were 
man-made. Within both categories, subcategories could be discerned. The largest 
subcategory in the animate group was formed by land mammals (cow, dog, squirrel, giraffe, 
kangaroo, monkey, bear, horse, cat, elephant, mouse, sheep, lion, reindeer, rabbit), while 
smaller subcategories consisted of birds (ostrich, eagle, swan, penguin, cockerel), reptiles 
(crocodile, snake, tortoise), fish (seahorse, fish), an amphibian (frog), a marine mammal 
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(seal) and an insect (butterfly). The largest subcategory in the inanimate group was formed 
by graspable objects for daily use (glasses, bell, key, umbrella, candle, watering can, padlock, 
wineglass, gun, umbrella, iron, anchor, shoe, flag), with smaller subcategories consisting of 
vehicles (car, bike, plane, pram, truck), furniture ( table, lamp, bed, chair), tools (hammer, 
pliers), instruments (guitar, trumpet) and a building (church). Each frame contained exactly 
1000 Gabor elements (Fig. 1). The mean numbers of elements on the object outline, 
enclosed within the outline (object surface area), and in the background (outside the 
outline) did not differ between the animate and inanimate objects (all Ps > 0.05). Overall the 
mean number of elements on the outlines was 105, the mean number of elements forming 
the object surface 158.   
 Each stimulus sequence consisted of 20 consecutively presented frames. In the first 
frame, all elements had a random orientation. In each subsequent frame all elements 
changed their orientation slightly with respect to the previous frame. However, for the 
subset of elements that formed the outline and surface area of the objects these orientation 
changes were coordinated, such that over the course of the 20 frames these elements 
gradually formed the object. In the last frame of the sequence, the elements were perfectly 
aligned along the object’s outline, while the elements making up the interior of the object 
(enclosed by the outline) had adopted an identical orientation parallel to the main object 
axis orientation. The remaining elements located outside the object continued to adopt 
random orientations throughout the entire 20 frame sequence (see Sassi, Vancleef, 
Machilsen, Panis, & Wagemans, 2010, for more details). Thus, the object could be identified 
on the basis of two cues: the object’s outline and the object’s interior, of which the outline 
was the most informative. The maximum on screen height and width of the objects was 10 
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and 14 cm (7 and 10 degrees of visual angle). The light grey Gabor elements were presented 
against a uniform darker grey background.  
  
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
 
To exclude the possibility that systematic differences in the geometrical complexity of 
the images of animate versus inanimate objects could affect the identification scores for 
these two categories, we quantified the complexity of the objects using the measures of 
compactness and homogeneity. Compactness was defined as (length outline)/(surface 
area)². Homogeneity was defined as (length outline)/(number of peaks)², where the number 
of peaks was based on an adaptive smoothing algorithm [Horng, 2003]. Thus silhouettes 
with fewer peaks have higher homogeneity values. For both tasks, the silhouettes of 
animate and inanimate end-objects did not differ from each other in compactness (t(54) = 
0.79, P = 0.43) or homogeneity (t(54) = 1.73, P = 0.09). 
 
Procedure 
  
Participants were seated in front of a 21 inch PC monitor at a distance of approximately 80 
cm (20° x 32° visual angle, height x width). All instructions and visual stimuli were presented 
on screen (E-prime, Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, USA; 600 x 800 resolution). 
Participants were instructed that they should verbally identify the emerging object as fast as 
possible, and that they could make an unlimited number of guesses. The experimenter 
recorded all guesses and the frame number (indicated at the top right corner of the screen) 
at which the correct answer was given. The flow of the frame presentation was thus not 
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interrupted by any answers provided, but occurred with fixed presentation durations, 
without intervals in between consecutive frames (ISI = 0; all answers were written down by 
the experimenter simultaneously with the presentation).  
First two practise trials were presented to familiarise the participants with the task (these 
objects were not included in the experiment), after which the experimenter verified the 
participant’s understanding of the task. Then fifty-six experimental trials were presented, 
half of which contained animate objects (28 trials) and the other half inanimate objects (28 
trials). Each trial started with a prompt to press the spacebar to start the trial. The first 10 
frames of the stimulus sequence were shown in a rapid succession of 1 frame per second; 
participants were allowed to guess during these first 10 frames but no one did (there simply 
wasn’t enough information to even make a guess). Starting from frame 11 (50%) the frames 
were shown at a rate of 2s per frame.  
In some cases, there was an alternative name for the object, which strictly speaking was 
incorrect, but which, given the rough object outlines, was plausible. For example, the 
donkey could be mistaken for a horse. Further, in common language different names are 
sometimes used for the same object, such as crocodile and alligator. These plausible 
alternative names were scored as correct answers. Very rarely, participants had not 
correctly identified the object by frame 20 (in less than 3% of the total number of trials). 
Rather than ignoring these data, we assigned them a score of 21. Trial order was individually 
randomized. 
The total experiment lasted on average 10 minutes. The exact duration was determined 
by the participant’s performance, as following a correct answer any remaining frames were 
shown at high rate (just to show the participant that the answer they had provided was 
indeed correct). All participants completed an online version of the AQ questionnaire 
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[Baron-Cohen et al., 2001] directly after the experiment (duration 5 minutes). Following the 
experiment (on the same or a subsequent day) the WAIS (TD and HFA) and ADOS (HFA) 
were administered. 
 
 
  
Results 
  
A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA, with End-object (animate vs. inanimate) as within-
subjects factor and Group (TD vs. HFA) as between-subjects factor, showed a significant 
main effect for End-object (F(1, 38) = 28.1, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.43), reflecting that the images 
of animate objects (M = 13.6, SD = 1.6) required more frames to identify than those of 
inanimate objects (M = 12.7, SD = 1.3) (Fig. 2A). The main effect for Group was also 
significant (F(1, 38) = 16.5, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.30), with the TD group (M = 12.4, SD = 1.3) 
performing better than the HFA group (M = 13.8, SD = 0.9). The Group by End-object 
interaction was significant (F(1, 38) = 11.8, P = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24). Subsequent t tests showed 
that the number of frames required by the TD group to identify the animate and inanimate 
objects did not differ (t(19) = 1.26, P  = 0.22). The HFA group, however, required more 
frames to identify animate objects than inanimate objects (t(19) = 6.5, P < 0.001). The 
animate objects were more readily identified by the TD group than by the HFA group (t(38) 
= 5.0, P < 0.001), while with respect to the identification of inanimate objects the TD group 
was only marginally better (t(38) = 2.4, P = 0.020, Bonferroni corrected α = 0.0125).   
  
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
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Analysis of incorrect guesses  
 
All incorrect guesses, i.e. guesses made before the correct answer (if any) was given, were 
recorded to be able to determine whether any differences existed between the two 
participant groups in absolute number of guesses and/or in the relative numbers of animate 
and inanimate guesses. This is relevant as a tendency to generate a lot of guesses might in 
itself increase the chance of giving the correct answer. The mean number of incorrect 
guesses prior to the correct answer per trial was marginally higher for the HFA group (M = 
0.21, SD = 0.12) than for the TD group (M = 0.11, SD = 0.07; t(38) = 3.07, P = 0.04). Thus, the 
better identification rates of the TD group were not due to generating more guesses. 
Further, both groups made significantly more animate than inanimate guesses. In the TD 
group, 70.1 % of all incorrect guesses were animate (29.9% was inanimate; t(19) = 6.7, P < 
0.001). In the HFA group, 64.3% of incorrect guesses were animate (35.7% was inanimate; 
t(19) = 3.2, P = 0.005). The proportions of animate and inanimate guesses made by the TD 
and HFA groups did not differ (t(38) = 0.74, P = 0.46). Finally, the proportions of animate 
guesses when the ultimate object was animate compared to inanimate did not differ (P = 
.74) and did not interact with the factor Group (P = .88).  
 
Correlations of task performance with various measures  
It is important to examine the heterogeneity of responses, particularly in the HFA group. Is 
the atypical processing of animate objects a characteristic that applies to all individuals in 
the HFA group, or to a subset, and is heterogeneity related to the severity of ASD 
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symptoms? Hereto correlations were calculated between their performance (mean score 
for animate objects minus mean score for inanimate objects) and two measures of ASD 
severity, AQ and ADOS. The Pearson correlations with AQ were not significant in either the 
TD (r = 0.22, P = 0.38) or HFA (r = -0.18, P = 0.45) group, nor was there in the HFA group a 
significant correlation with the ADOS scores (r = 0.007, P = 0.98).  
We further examined a possible contribution of the factors IQ and Sex to the atypical 
animate processing. Neither factor correlated significantly with performance (IQ-TD, r = 
0.052, P = 0.89; IQ-HFA, r = 0.19, P = 0.42; Sex-TD, r = -0.06, P = 0.80; Sex-HFA, r = 0.26, P =  
0.26). 
 
 
Discussion 
  
The present study explored whether individuals with HFA have an impairment in identifying 
impoverished objects as compared to closely matched, typically-developed, controls, and 
whether it mattered if the object that had to be identified was animate or inanimate. We 
used a new identification task involving images built up from Gabor elements, a subset of 
which gradually, from one frame to the next, formed an object. This gave the illusion of an 
object gradually appearing out of a dense fog, devoid of local information.  
The HFA group was significantly poorer in identifying the objects than the TD group,  
 
However, crucially, the poorer identification rate was due almost exclusively to the 
identification of the animate objects. With respect to inanimate objects, the HFA group was 
only marginally poorer than the TD group. These results are in line with the findings by 
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Burnett and Jellema [2013], who used impoverished objects that still contained local details 
due to their uninterrupted outlines. However, in the current study the ‘animate impairment’ 
was even more pronounced, possibly because the objects were devoid of local information.  
It should be noted though that with a less severe correction for multiple comparisons, 
the HFA group would perform worse than the TD group also in the inanimate condition.  
Burnett & Jellema [2013] found a very similar trend towards poorer identification of 
impoverished inanimate objects in the HFA group compared to the TD group. Possibly, the 
overall identification impairment reflects impaired visual integration skills [Happé & Ronald, 
2008]. It is consistent with the idea that individuals with ASD have impairments in the 
forming of new concepts (strictly speaking in identifying impoverished objects) [cf. Johnson 
& Rakison, 2006] and that they rely more than TD individuals on local information [Happé & 
Frith, 2006]. Other factors such as speed of response and attention may play a role too, but 
this requires further study.  
 
The intriguing finding that the impairment was limited to animate objects, while 
inanimate objects remained largely unaffected, supports the idea of a processing 
impairment in ASD specifically for animate objects [cf. Hobson, 1987], rather than a general 
identification impairment [Landry & Bryson, 2004]. Support for the notion that the 
identification impairment was specific for animate objects comes from the study by Evers et 
al. [2014], where a distinction was made between man-made and natural objects, rather 
than between man-made and animate objects. Their natural objects included plants, trees, 
fruits and just a few animals, while the animate category in the current study consisted 
exclusively of animals and humans. Crucially, Evers and co-workers [2014] found no 
identification differences in the ASD group (nor in the TD group) between the man-made 
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and natural objects. This supports the notion that the identification impairment may be 
limited to animate objects, i.e. living creatures that exert control over their limbs and bodies 
to make/adopt a variety of movements/postures. 
 
The notion that individuals with HFA have relative difficulty processing animate stimuli 
relative to TD individuals is not new. However, the unique contribution of the current study 
is that it shows that such an impairment does not depend on relatively low-level visual 
processes such as figure-ground discrimination and grouping/integration of contour 
elements. Rather, it suggests that the impairment occurs at a higher, conceptual, level [cf. 
Evers et al., 2014]. It seems that, even though in the HFA group animate concepts are 
readily available (as indicated by the similar guess patterns), for the individuals with HFA the 
shapes (outlines) of objects are less uniquely, or less prominently, linked to the identity of 
those objects in the animate domain than in the inanimate domain.  An uncertainty seems 
to creep in specifically with respect to the association between the shape and identity of 
animate objects. These insights should contribute to a better qualification of the huge 
phenotypic variability found in ASD, which variability complicates  the diagnosis and 
treatment of this disorder [Mundy, Henderson, Inge, & Coman, 2007].  
 
Interestingly, the behavioural results are echoed by neuroanatomical findings that 
animate and inanimate objects tend to be processed and represented in designated, largely 
non-overlapping, brain areas. For example, the lateral posterior part of the fusiform gyrus is 
primarily activated by faces [McCarthy, Pruce, Gore, & Allison, 1997], whereas the medial 
fusiform gyrus seems more responsive to tools [Wiggett, Pritchard, & Downing, 2009]. A 
similar dissociation is seen in the lateral temporal lobe, where the superior temporal sulcus 
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(STS) specifically responds to the form and motion of animate objects [Allison, Puce, & 
McCarthy, 2000; Jellema & Perrett, 2003, 2005], whereas the superior temporal gyrus 
seems primarily responsive to tools [Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2002]. The 
interpretation of simple geometric shapes in motion as either conveying social interactions 
or mechanical actions also elicited responses in distinctly different temporal areas [Martin & 
Weisberg, 2003]. Human lesion studies [e.g. Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Caramazza & 
Shelton, 1998] further highlighted the dissociation. Therefore, selective malfunctioning in 
areas dedicated to animate processing might be related to the reported behavioural effects. 
Especially the STS is interesting in this respect as the STS has been reported to be 
anatomically and functionally compromised in ASD [e.g. Zilbovicius et al., 2006].  
 
There are, however, a number of factors, other than the (in)animate nature of the objects, 
which could in principle have contributed to the different identification scores. These will be 
examined next. 
If the form of the animate objects was more complex than that of the inanimate objects, 
then this could have selectively disadvantaged individuals with ASD in their recognition of 
animate objects as they are thought to have impaired visual integration skills [Happé & 
Ronald, 2008]. However, the compactness and homogeneity scores did not differ between 
the sets of animate and inanimate objects, indicating they were equally complex in terms of 
their shapes (outlines).  
If the HFA group were more familiar with, or had been more exposed to, inanimate than 
animate objects, while the TD group were equally familiar with both groups of objects, then 
that could in principle explain the different identification rates. However, given that the two 
participant groups were very closely matched (both groups consisted of undergraduate 
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students from the same universities, following the same courses, with similar daily 
routines), this is an unlikely explanation. Moreover, all objects (animate and inanimate) 
were selected for being well-known, everyday, objects and were typical exemplars of their 
category, not requiring any specialist interests.  
Different guess-patterns could in principle have affected the identification rates. If one 
group would generate a lot more guesses than the other, or would generate a 
disproportionate number of guesses in one category, then their chances of making a correct 
guess would increase. A failure to generate guesses could have reflected a cognitive deficit, 
but might also reflect the task requirement to produce the responses verbally to the 
examiner, which is a ‘social’ response. However, the analysis of the incorrect guesses 
showed that, if anything, the HFA group made more guesses than the TD group, while the 
proportions of animate and inanimate guesses were very similar in both groups. Thus, any 
differences in identification of the objects in the two tasks cannot be attributed to different 
guess patterns.  
Could a general deficit in establishing abstract categories [Dawson & Lewy, 1989; Landry 
& Bryson, 1994] have selectively disadvantaged the identification of animate objects in the 
HFA group? It might be that the extent to which the different exemplars that make up an 
abstract category differ from each other in shape and appearance affects the identification 
scores. Some anecdotal evidence seems to support this notion. For example, Temple 
Grandin commented on the problems she experienced with the abstract category of dogs 
[Grandin, 1995]. In order to identify a newly encountered breed of dog as a dog (dog breeds 
differ hugely in size and shape), her memory for already established examples of dog breeds 
needed to be deliberately updated with the new breed, as she lacked the abstract concept 
of what a dog is. If it would be true that the objects that comprise animate concepts come in 
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a wider range of forms and shapes than the objects that comprise inanimate concepts, then 
such a general deficit in forming abstract concepts could indeed selectively impair the 
identification of animate concepts. However, most exemplars of animate concepts that 
were used in the current study [e.g. chicken, penguin, giraffe, crocodile, squirrel] do not 
come in such big shape varieties as dogs. Moreover, the Snodgrass & Vanderwart [1980] set 
used only “canonical/prototypical” object representations. The inanimate objects that were 
used also come in large shape varieties, probably even more so than the animate ones (e.g. 
lamp, plane, car, shoe, table). A selective disadvantage for animate concepts due to a 
general deficit in forming abstract concepts is therefore unlikely.  
Further, individual exemplars of the animate category may adopt a larger variety of 
shapes than those of the inanimate category due to the animate propensity of limb or body 
part articulation. However, again, the use of exclusively prototypical object shapes seems to 
neutralise this.  A logical consequence of the propensity of animate objects to move is that 
they are often seen ‘in motion’, while inanimate objects tend to be seen ‘static’. Whether 
this somehow might have affected results is unknown and remains to be investigated.    
 
The unlikelihood of the above alternative explanations leaves open the possibility of a 
genuine impairment in the processing of animate objects in ASD. Such an impairment might 
be related to malfunctioning of the ‘social brain’ [Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998; Allison et 
al., 2000], which brain areas show reduced/aberrant activity in individuals with ASD [e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Dapretto et al., 2006]. Such 
an impairment would contribute to the paucity of social experiences in individuals with ASD, 
and, since these experiences provide the foundations for social development [Dawson, 
1991], impede social development.   
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Legends 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Participant characteristics. Age is in years. Standard deviation and range are shown 
between brackets. F, female; M, male; AQ, Autism spectrum Quotient; IQ-T, total IQ score; 
IQ-V, verbal IQ score; IQ-P, Performance IQ score. 
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Figure 1. Two examples of stimulus sequences resulting in an animate object (top row; 
image of a penguin, compactness: 103, homogeneity: 13) and an inanimate object (bottom 
row; image of a guitar, compactness: 103, homogeneity: 8). In actual trials 20 frames at 5% 
change were presented.  
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Figure 2.  The mean number of images required to correctly identify the animate and 
inanimate objects is shown for the TD and HFA groups. A higher number of frames reflects 
poorer identification. Standard errors (SEM) are indicated. Bonferroni corrected α = 0.0125. 
 
 
 
